/lit/ - Literature

>>23435318
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

>>23429003
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23423258
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
Vasubandhu is also relevant for his parallels to Greek Orphic cult ritual, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle.

>>23419332
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23409613
Arguments for segregation:
>Classical philology has been its distinct discipline since before the fall of Rome
>Until three centuries ago, knowledge of Classical philology was common to all men of letters
>There are more Classics journals than Indology journals
>The direct influence of Sanskrit works is much more recent than the influence of Classical works, which have always been infinitely more influential
>Arguing about the scope of the topic would derail actual discussion of the topic
Arguments for integration:
>There are approximately three people on /lit/ who can read Sanskrit, which means that this general will have four replies before dying

>>23397919
>>23397944
>>23397950
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23398050
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
>Nāgārjuna argues, however, that there is no such end-point and denies the existence of an ontological foundation (see Westerhoff 2017. For the relation of this idea to the debate about the well-foundedness of grounding in contemporary metaphysics see chapter 3 of Westerhoff 2020). This fact is sometimes used as support of the accusation that Madhyamaka is really a nihilistic doctrine, a doctrine that nothing exists. For if the secondary existent is reduced to the primary, and if there is no primary, what is there left? This interpretation has a relatively long history, beginning in ancient India and continuing to find supporters nowadays (see Spackman 2014, Westerhoff 2016). Nevertheless, there are powerful systematic and historical reasons against it. First of all, it is not clear that this kind of ontological nihilism is in fact a consistent position (if there is nothing, is there not at least the fact that there is nothing, i.e. something? See, however, Westerhoff 2021). Secondly, the Mādhyamikas themselves are very clear that their position avoids both of the extreme views, the view that believes in the existence of svabhāva as well as its nihilistic opposite.

>>23397801
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23394309
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23383744
All the replies below this one would do well to note that free will as we debate the question in the West is a consequence of Augustine (and later Luther) attempting to reconcile an omnipotent, omniscient God with the ontological existence of evil. Augustine (and later Luther) reconcile the contradiction with the doctrine of original sin.
In Buddhism, there is no omniscient, omnipotent God (see Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu), so we should not presuppose the Western paradigm of free will.
>Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
>As Karin Meyer's judicious 'Free Persons, Empty Selves' shows, Buddhist philosophers had no interest in controversies about free will. Buddhists deny that there are any enduring substances and a fortiori any selves worthy of the name. Most of us suppose ourselves to be individual continuants, but this is a misconception perpetuated by conventions of thought and language. No selves, no free will and no real individual agency here, just successive complexes of transient events. Meyer's formulation of a Buddhist version of 'compatibilism' (which Kant called 'a wretched subterfuge', and I call 'the freedom of the free-range chicken') looks promising, but hopes are dashed when one reads that 'it is important to note that this solution is not described in any classical [Buddhist] source' (p. 44). That sad admission is confirmed by Jay Garfield in 'Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas'. Given that there is no self with a will that might be free or otherwise, it is unsurprising that 'it is impossible to formulate the thesis of the freedom of the will in a Buddhist framework' (p. 175) and only to be expected that recent exponents of Buddhist philosophy have been doing precisely that!
ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/free-will-agency-and-selfhood-in-indian-philosophy/
Read Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Augustine, and Luther (especially The Bondage of the Will, WA 18: 600–787). Then read Philip Melanchthon, Martin Chemnitz, and Johann Gerhard, who represent the apogee of the Christian tradition and reveal that asking how Buddhists reconcile free will with determinism is a presupposition failure akin to asking why Aristotle never considered organic synthesis in his study of chemistry and physics.

>>23374418
>Nāgārjuna argues, however, that there is no such end-point and denies the existence of an ontological foundation (see Westerhoff 2017. For the relation of this idea to the debate about the well-foundedness of grounding in contemporary metaphysics see chapter 3 of Westerhoff 2020). This fact is sometimes used as support of the accusation that Madhyamaka is really a nihilistic doctrine, a doctrine that nothing exists. For if the secondary existent is reduced to the primary, and if there is no primary, what is there left? This interpretation has a relatively long history, beginning in ancient India and continuing to find supporters nowadays (see Spackman 2014, Westerhoff 2016). Nevertheless, there are powerful systematic and historical reasons against it. First of all, it is not clear that this kind of ontological nihilism is in fact a consistent position (if there is nothing, is there not at least the fact that there is nothing, i.e. something? See, however, Westerhoff 2021). Secondly, the Mādhyamikas themselves are very clear that their position avoids both of the extreme views, the view that believes in the existence of svabhāva as well as its nihilistic opposite.

>>23361689
Nāgārjuna refutes all views of existence and non-existence with his metalogic. Read Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

>>23358453
>Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press.
>As Karin Meyer's judicious 'Free Persons, Empty Selves' shows, Buddhist philosophers had no interest in controversies about free will. Buddhists deny that there are any enduring substances and a fortiori any selves worthy of the name. Most of us suppose ourselves to be individual continuants, but this is a misconception perpetuated by conventions of thought and language. No selves, no free will and no real individual agency here, just successive complexes of transient events. Meyer's formulation of a Buddhist version of 'compatibilism' (which Kant called 'a wretched subterfuge', and I call 'the freedom of the free-range chicken') looks promising, but hopes are dashed when one reads that 'it is important to note that this solution is not described in any classical [Buddhist] source' (p. 44). That sad admission is confirmed by Jay Garfield in 'Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas'. Given that there is no self with a will that might be free or otherwise, it is unsurprising that 'it is impossible to formulate the thesis of the freedom of the will in a Buddhist framework' (p. 175) and only to be expected that recent exponents of Buddhist philosophy have been doing precisely that!
ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/free-will-agency-and-selfhood-in-indian-philosophy/
Read Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Augustine, and Luther (especially The Bondage of the Will, WA 18: 600–787). Then read Philip Melanchthon, Martin Chemnitz, and Johann Gerhard, who represent the apogee of the Christian tradition and reveal that asking how Buddhists reconcile free will with determinism is a presupposition failure akin to asking why Aristotle never considered organic synthesis in his study of chemistry and physics.

>>23322890
Buddhism (and some Confucianism)

>>23317863
The greatest Buddhists:
>Nāgārjuna
>Vasubandhu
>Saṃghabhadra
>Dignāga
>Dharmakīrti
The greatest Muslims:
>Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi
>Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî
>Avicenna
>Averroes
The greatest Christians:
>Augustine
>St. Thomas Aquinas
>Martin Luther
>Philip Melanchthon
>Martin Chemnitz
>Johann Gerhard

>>23311685
>>23311838
Buddhists and Buddhism
>Nāgārjuna
>Vasubandhu
>Saṃghabhadra
>Dignāga
>Dharmakīrti
Confucians and Confucianism
>Confucius
>Mencius

>>23257711
>>23257412
There was already this Nāgārjuna thread.

What is the best translation of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way)? Nāgārjuna's Primary Literature Bibliography on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists five translations with commentary accessible to philosophers without specialized training in Indology:
>Jay Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. Translation and Commentary of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
>Jay Garfield, Geshe Ngawang Samten, Ocean of Reasoning. A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by rJe Tshong Khapa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
>Siderits, Mark and Shōryū Katsura: Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2013.
>Ian Coghlan, Buddhapālita’s Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamaka-Vṛtti, Boston, Wisdom, 2022.
>Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü, Ornament of Reason. The Great Commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Root of the Middle Way, Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2011.
Is Wisdom Publications as academic as Oxford University Press?
How is Plato related to Nāgārjuna? How is Aristotle related to Nāgārjuna? How is Confucius related to Nāgārjuna? How is Epicurus related to Nāgārjuna?

>>2890424
any reference to that derrida-nagarjuna thing?