/lit/ - Literature

>>22472976
>Only Schopenhauer and Nietzsche really understood this.
lol imagine not reading Hegel

>we may answer those who thus insist on the truth and certainty of the reality of objects of sense, by saying that they had better be sent back to the most elementary school of wisdom, the ancient Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus; they have not yet learnt the inner secret of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. For one who is initiated into these mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of things of sense, but gets into a state of despair about it altogether; and in dealing with them he partly himself brings about the nothingness of those things, partly he sees these bring about their own nothingness. Even animals are not shut off from this wisdom, but show they are deeply initiated into it. For they do not stand stock still before things of sense as if these were things per se, with being in themselves: they despair of this reality altogether, and in complete assurance of the nothingness of things they fall-to without more ado and eat them up. And all nature proclaims, as animals do, these open secrets, these mysteries revealed to all, which teach what the truth of things of sense is.

>...man thinks, and seeks freedom and a basis for conduct in thought. Divine as his right to act in this way is, it becomes a wrong, when it takes the place of thinking. Thought then regards itself as free only when it is conscious of being at variance with what is generally recognised, and of setting itself up as something original.

>>22460983
THERE IS NO ROYAL ROAD TO SCIENCE

*except for anupaya-- a very rare case in which a śaktipāta awakening so intense that one single teaching from a true guru is enough to stabilize that awakening permanently.

>what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition.

The Owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk. You won't get Hegel and will never get Hegel unless you actually do the work of reading the whole system and acheiving an intellectual intuition of the idea of the system as a whole and the role all the parts and moments play in the system and their true meaning in the context of that intuition of the whole. In simple terms, Hegel requires initiation (running through the course of dialectic) to be understood. You are either take the leap of faith and run through the dialectic hoping in the end it'll all make sense and enter into the ranks of the initiates or drop out and remain with the profane and seethe and cope as you do now.

>>22442629
Nothing. I love science too.

>>22427364
>the feeling that God Himself is dead
this just a moment in the historical dialectic retard. He's not saying God is actually dead; he's describing the consciousness of someone at this stage of the dialectic. Now go back.

>>22426177
>Hegelsisters

>Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, PHILOSOPHY, and certain forms of artistic production.
nothing personal kid.

>Speculative truth, it may also be noted, means very much the same as what, in special connection with religious experience and doctrines, used to be called Mysticism.

>there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding

>the reason-world may be equally styled mystical – not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding.

>>22417820
>>22417835
>>22418007
>>22418349
>>22419247
>>22419265
based beyond reckoning

also>>22418007
>woman bad

Hegel:
>Men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. When women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions.

>just because consciousness has, in general, knowledge of an object, there is already present the distinction that the inherent nature, what the object is in itself, is one thing to consciousness, while knowledge, or the being of the object for consciousness, is another moment. Upon this distinction, which is present as a fact, the examination turns. Should both, when thus compared, not correspond, consciousness seems bound to alter its knowledge, in order to make it fit the object. BUT IN THE ALTERATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE, THE OBJECT ITSELF ALSO, IN POINT OF FACT, IS ALTERED; for the knowledge which existed was essentially a knowledge of the object; with change in the knowledge, the object also becomes different, since it belonged essentially to this knowledge.
spooky.

>>22398259
>the reason-world may be equally styled mystical – not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding.

>>22396886
>Hegel himself was not explicitly religious

Hegel
>God and God only is the Truth.

INB4 muh Hegel
>I would mention that in [the Science of Logic] I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

Hegel is the most Kantian of Kantians.

INB4 muh Hegel
>>I would mention that in [the Science of Logic] I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

I like Hegel by the way; the most Kantian of Kantians

Gott mit uns

INB4 but muh Hegel
>I would mention that in [the Science of Logic] I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

I like Hegel by the way; the most Kantian of Kantians

Gott mit uns

INB4 but muh Hegel
>I would mention that in [the Science of Logic] I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

I like Hegel by the way; the most Kantian of Kantians

Gott mit uns

INB4 dude but Hegel
>>I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

>>22355378
>I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that ITS MERIT REMAINS UNAFFECTED BY WHATEVER FAULTS MAY BE FOUND IN IT. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently FOR GENUINE KNOWLEDGE, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one MUST turn to that preceding exposition.

>>22333080
>Look at all the different directions he’s been twisted into over the years
ironically he refutes this by saying this is a lazyfag argument, and just because people get filtered and misread doesn't mean there isn't a true or correct reading of his work, and basically he says stop being a whiny bitch and go read more and reflect on your reading and discover the truth for yourself. Very Kantian actually: the most Kantian of Kantians in fact.

>>22334316
good choice anon, but still, even Science of Logic constantly refers to Critique of Pure Reason

>I would mention that in this work I frequently refer to the Kantian philosophy (which to many may seem superfluous) because whatever may be said, both in this work and elsewhere, about the precise character of this philosophy and about particular parts of its exposition, it constitutes the base and the starting point of recent German philosophy and that its merit remains unaffected by whatever faults may be found in it. The reason too why reference must often be made to it in the objective logic is that it enters into detailed consideration of important, more specific aspects of logic, whereas later philosophical works have paid little attention to these and in some instances have only displayed a crude — not unavenged — contempt for them. The philosophising which is most widespread among us does not go beyond the Kantian results, that Reason cannot acquire knowledge of any true content or subject matter and in regard to absolute truth must be directed to faith. But what with Kant is a result, forms the immediate starting-point in this philosophising, so that the preceding exposition from which that result issued and which is a philosophical cognition, is cut away beforehand. The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled. Consequently for genuine knowledge, for a specific content of thought which is not to be found in such barren and arid complacency, one must turn to that preceding exposition.

>>22321303
it's metaphysics. metaphysics is what you are looking for.

>>22321809
>Go ahead and look at what Magee says about Hegel's equation of the speculative with mysticism, and how Magee frames it as though mysticism here means what it ordinarily means, and then look at the Encyclopedia where Hegel criticizes taking it in just that way as a flaw of the Understanding's comprehension of mysticism

Hegel:
>SPECULATIVE truth, it may also be noted, MEANS very much THE SAME AS what, in special connection with religious experience and doctrines, used to be called MYSTICISM. The term Mysticism is at present used, as a rule, to designate what is mysterious and incomprehensible: and in proportion as their general culture and way of thinking vary, the epithet is applied by one class to denote the real and the true, by another to name everything connected with superstition and deception.

>On which we first of all remark that there is mystery in the mystical, only however for the understanding which is ruled by the principle of abstract identity; whereas the MYSTICAL , as SYNONYMOUS with the SPECULATIVE, is the concrete unity of those propositions which understanding only accepts in their separation and opposition. And if those who recognise Mysticism as the highest truth are content to leave it in its original utter mystery, their conduct only proves that for them too, as well as for their antagonists, thinking means abstract identification, and that in their opinion, therefore truth can only be won by renouncing thought, or as it is frequently expressed, by leading the reason captive.

>But, as we have seen, the abstract thinking of understanding is so far from being either ultimate or stable, that it shows a perpetual tendency to work its own dissolution and swing round into its opposite. Reasonableness, on the contrary, just consists in embracing within itself these opposites as unsubstantial elements. Thus the REASON-WORLD may be EQUALLY styled MYSTICAL – not however because thought cannot both reach and comprehend it, but merely because it lies beyond the compass of understanding.

>>22315525
The initiates are certainly given hints to the existence ofa secret doctrine. Cornford is right to say that Socrates' failure to define knowledge in propositional terms. in the Theaetetus, definitely points the way towards the inadequacy of propositional knowledge to attain the final revelation. The revelation is the direct acquaintance knowing of the Forms, but of course this is left unstated. In passages, from the Republic, there is an indication that the truths revealed by dialectic are not ultimate. Socrates tells Glaucon that it appears that dialectic brings us to the end of philosophical enquiry. However, he then hints that there is a further path to ultimate knowledge that dispenses with images and symbols and attains truth directly. Glaucon is then told that, despite having the will to do so, Socrates is unable to show him this path:

[Q27] Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying. You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part there will be no lack of good will. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth as it appears to me.

This evidently hints at the type of intuition Kant denies in the Inaugural Dissertation when he observes, "No intuition of things intellectual but only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of them is given to man".

>>22199837
>Brandom/Pippin way of reading his Logic as categories of merely thought alone and not also the form of reality itself
seriously? how tf can a professional misread hegel so badly?

>What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought ARE the content and the ultimate truth itself.

Why is it so hard to believe that the greatest modern philosopher actually believed what he explicitly said over and over again that he believed- in fact asserted he knew absolutely?